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ABSTRACT 
Business sustainability refers to economic sustainability performance that 
promotes profitability and to non-financial sustainability that may or may 
not create profitability. This paper concentrates on the relation between 
business sustainability and insolvency proceedings by asking what role 
business sustainability plays when choosing between restructuring 
(rescue) and liquidation proceedings. This choice is based on two tests: a 
viability test and a best interest of creditors test, the latter meaning that 
no dissenting creditor should be worse off in restructuring than in 
liquidation proceedings. In addition, the paper asks what role business 
sustainability plays when making the choice between restructuring and 
liquidation and what the consequences of this choice are for business 
sustainability elements. In addition, the paper asks who the stakeholders 
for business sustainability are in insolvency situations. The finding of the 
study is that creditor interest should be better balanced with non-financial 
sustainability, but with the requirement that creditors know the risks 
beforehand and are able to protect their interests, for example, through 
securities. Regarding environmental hazards, the paper suggests a “super 
responsibility” of bankruptcy estates to handle environmental problems, 
according to the precedent of the Canadian Supreme Court. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Business sustainability refers to a corporation’s strategy for long-term 
survival on the market and for operating in an ecologically, socially, and 
culturally responsible manner. Business sustainability includes financial 
economic sustainability performance (ESP) and non-financial 
environmental, social, ethical, and governance (ESEG) sustainability. ESP 
refers to long-term profitability and financial sustainability (operational 
effectiveness, efficiency, productivity, earnings, returns on investment, 
and market value), which create company value, whereas ESEG 
sustainability may or may not create this kind of value [1]. That is, ESEG 
sustainability owns intrinsic ethical value without being subordinate to 
profitability. ESEG sustainability is linked to “sustainable development”, a 
normative and holistic conceptual framework for integrating economic 
development, social well-being, and environmental protection into 
decision making [2]. The concept originates from Brundtland-
Commission’s Report (1987) [3].  
The first introduction to corporate sustainability thinking was the 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) concept, nowadays viewed as a part 
of business sustainability. According to the European Union Commission’s 
definition, CSR is “the responsibility of enterprises for their impact on 
society”. Besides respecting regulations, companies can become socially 
responsible by integrating social, environmental, ethical, consumer, and 
human rights concerns into their business strategy and operations [4]. 
Tensions may occur between financial ESP and non-financial ESEG 
sustainability: the management of a company is perhaps unwilling to 
invest in ESEG sustainability against shareholders’ ESP interests. In 
addition, tensions may ride inside concerning the components of ESEG 
sustainability: within the limits of scarce resources, management must be 
selective in its ESEG initiatives. However, it is possible to see financial and 
non-financial sustainability performance—not conflicting but—integrated 
in the multiplayer field of sustainability, with possibilities of promoting 
both financial and non-financial objectives. Frameworks with an 
integrated and holistic approach to business sustainability and reporting 
have been developed in sustainability science, identifying management, 
shareholders, governance participants, society, and the environment as 
stakeholders [1]. 
An essential part of sustainability performance, commitment, and 
transparency is the reporting system used by a company. Traditional one 
bottom line financial reporting—showing the balance sheet, the profit and 
loss account, and the notes—leaves a loophole for companies to escape 
from issuing the non-financial information on the environmental and 
societal impacts of their operations. Instead, by presenting a triple bottom 
line (TBL) accounting and report (a framework including social, 
environmental, and financial elements) [5], a company can evidence its 
commitment to ESEG sustainability. The integrated reporting system 
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combines financial and non-financial information (profit, planet, and 
people) [6]. 
The ESP/ESEG sustainability discussion has concentrated on the 
operations of companies. However, not all companies will survive the 
competition on the market. For example, in the European Union (EU), 
every year, insolvency or imminent insolvency is the fate of 200,000 firms, 
and acute crises could multiply this number. A bankruptcy of one 
company may lead to a domino effect and cause the collapse of many other 
companies in the same production or supply chain; one in six corporate 
insolvencies occurs due to the collapse of a partner company [7]. When the 
value of a company drops, the investors and shareholders suffer losses. 
Nevertheless, insolvency is a natural factor and a common risk on the 
market. With this in mind, surprisingly, little research is available 
studying corporate sustainability in insolvency situations. This paper aims 
to fill this gap and stimulate discussion by viewing business sustainability 
in an insolvency context. 
In cases of deep insolvency without the likelihood for viability, 
liquidation proceedings are the only alternative, whereas in the opposite 
situation, a choice between liquidation (bankruptcy) and restructuring 
must be made. This leads either to the opening of liquidation or 
restructuring proceedings. On this account, as there is an obvious shortage 
of funds in insolvency situations, all stakeholders—especially investors, 
other creditors, subcontractors, and employees—cannot be satisfied in 
full, and it is not possible to continue business as usual. By this point, the 
business has come to a crossroads, perhaps even an end. Accordingly, a 
competition of scarce funds starts between the different stakeholder 
groups. In the insolvency state of affairs, a prominent feature is added 
interests of creditors, both as a collective body but also as mutual 
conflicting interests inside this body. 
The viability of businesses and the objective of procedure divide 
insolvency proceedings into two separate proceedings: restructuring 
(rescue) and liquidation (in many countries called “bankruptcy”). 
Liquidation is understood here as a “conventional” bankruptcy with the 
aim to sell the assets (piecemeal or as a going concern), in contrast to 
“strategic bankruptcy” through which restructuring-like proceedings are 
initiated to preserve value for stakeholders [8]. 
Restructuring aims to ensure a company’s recovery to a profitable 
business through a reorganization plan and repayment schedule, perhaps 
including a partial discharge of debts. On the contrary, liquidation 
proceedings do not aim to continue the operation beyond selling the assets 
(for this difference, see, e.g., the judgement of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union in Smallsteps BV case, C-126/16) [9]. At the end of 
liquidation proceedings, the operation ceases and the legal structure of the 
company will be wound up and the entity removed from the registry.  
This paper will concentrate on the relation between business 
sustainability (ESP/ESEG) and insolvency proceedings. This relation will be 
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reflected with a focus on the choice between restructuring (rescue) and 
liquidation proceedings. 
First, this paper views the criteria for making the choice of 
“restructuring versus bankruptcy” from a sustainability perspective. The 
court or other competent authority decides whether the company is still 
viable. If not, liquidation proceedings will be opened. In legal systems with 
separate proceedings for rescue and liquidation from the beginning, this 
choice must be made in the opening phase, whereas in systems with single 
insolvency proceedings to be opened, this choice is made later, during the 
proceedings. Nonetheless, at some point, the choice is unavoidable: to 
rescue or liquidate? Second, this paper queries, from a sustainability 
perspective, the consequences of choosing between rescue and liquidation. 
The third topic asks who the stakeholders are that must be considered in 
an insolvency situation, as well as the position of ESEG elements there. 
In summary, the following issues will be discussed to develop an 
approach to the relationship between business sustainability and 
insolvency proceedings:  
(a) What role as criteria does business sustainability (ESP/ESEG) play 
when choosing between restructuring (rescue) and bankruptcy 
(liquidation)? 
(b) What are consequences of this choice for business sustainability 
elements? 
(c) Who are the stakeholders for business sustainability in an insolvency 
situation; are the ESEG elements included? 
The purpose of this article is to clarify the importance of discussing 
business sustainability in a common situation in which a company faces 
financial difficulties and is in or on the edge of insolvency. The main 
approach here takes the perspective of the EU Community acquis. 
Accordingly, a legal comparison of the national laws of member states is 
omitted. Even within the EU, national laws concerning bankruptcy vary, 
including the value of assets at the beginning of the procedure, the claims 
structure (such as seniority), and the legal environment of the proceedings 
[10]. Much of the same applies to restructuring. 
Sustainability science divides sustainability into weak and strong. 
Weak sustainability adopts the notion that natural capital is substitutable 
and the essential matter is the total amount of capital stock. In contrast, 
strong sustainability postulates the non-substitutability of natural 
resources (not reproducible by human efforts) [9]. When referring to an 
environmental element within the ESEG elements or values, this article 
denotes strong sustainability, that is, ESEG sustainability is not 
substitutable by improving ESP in insolvency proceedings. 
The paper is divided into six parts. The first part analyzes the role of 
ESP/ESEG elements using a viability test and best interest of creditors test 
(BIT) when choosing between rescue and liquidation. The second part 
focuses on the consequences for different stakeholders of the choice 
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between rescue and liquidation in an ESP/ESEG context. The third section 
views environmental sustainability elements in restructuring and 
liquidation. Finally, before conclusions, the purpose of a corporation is 
discussed in a combined insolvency and sustainability context. 
RESCUE OR LIQUIDATION?  
The Choice Is Inevitable in Insolvency Situations 
Before opening insolvency proceedings, the company should be 
defined as a debtor company that is facing an insolvency or imminent 
insolvency. Opening insolvency proceedings against profitable and 
healthy businesses is harmful and may indicate abuse of the legal system 
or creditor/debtor misdemeanors. This is why it is important that the court 
or other competent authority has the power to determine the status of a 
company (insolvency “diagnose”). 
The meaning of the term “insolvency” varies in different countries. For 
example, in the EU Directive on restructuring and insolvency (EU) 
2019/1023 [11], hereinafter the RI Directive, the concept of “insolvency” is 
not determined but left for the national laws to define. Insolvency may 
refer, for example, to a non-temporary cash/liquidity crisis and/or to over-
indebtedness. In the same way, the term “imminent insolvency” is left 
open, as well as the term “viability”. Notwithstanding, they are the core 
concepts of corporations in economic crisis. For example, the usual 
prerequisite for restructuring is that the debtor company must indicate, 
on the one hand, imminent insolvency that will likely turn to (full) 
insolvency in default of restructuring and, on the other, the possibility of 
recovery—not only impermanently—through restructuring. In other 
words, at the same time, there must be a risk for insolvency and enough 
potential to recover.  
In an insolvency or imminent insolvency situation, the choice between 
liquidation and restructuring is not arbitrary or free, but two tests must 
commonly be done: (a) a viability test and (b) a BIT. In the case of viability, 
rescue is well grounded; otherwise, a non-viable company should be set in 
liquidation. A viability test includes a comparison of the current status of 
the company (without any reorganization plan and payment schedule) 
and the prognoses of profitability. A BIT, in turn, means that no dissenting 
creditor should be worse off in restructuring than in liquidation 
proceedings (whether piecemeal or as a going concern). According to 
Article 2(6) of the RI Directive, the test is satisfied if no dissenting creditor 
would be worse off under a restructuring plan than if the normal ranking 
of liquidation priorities under national laws was applied, either in the 
event of liquidation, whether piecemeal or by sale as a going concern, or 
in the event of the next-best-alternative scenario if the restructuring plan 
were not confirmed. The next-best-alternative scenario refers to “an 
upgraded EU BIT” and can be, inter alia, a different restructuring plan with 
adequate support or the continuation of the debtor’s business without any 
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restructuring plan [12]. However, in this paper, for the sake of clarity, the 
BIT refers only to official liquidation proceedings as an alternative. Thus, 
the BIT includes a comparison of two types of insolvency proceedings, 
demonstrating the financial result from a creditor’s viewpoint. 
The relation between these two tests is not quite clear. A viability test 
may show that, in the long run, the company is viable, but in the short run, 
some or all creditors may be worse off compared to after liquidation 
proceedings. At the same time, a viability test measures shareholders’ 
interests when evaluating the prospects for company survival. At first, a 
viability test is usually carried out by the management and finally by the 
court or other authority that is competent to open the official insolvency 
proceedings. In turn, a BIT is usually done by the court when a creditor is 
challenging the choice of restructuring proceedings as detrimental to the 
creditor’s interests compared to liquidation. 
When facing insolvency, a company is at a crossroads: “something” has 
to be done. The transition from economic distress to a performing 
enterprise on the market is a decisive moment for any company. Taking 
efficient measures for revival on the market is a true test of a corporation’s 
capability to analyze its weaknesses and potential strengths. It is also 
imperative for the management to take quick action: in the case of 
viability, management should, for example, ensure a better competitive 
position on the market; improve the financial balance, usually with “fresh 
money”, and implement strategies to develop the business toward 
recovery [13]. In the case of non-viability, quick action is needed, as well. 
Otherwise, the situation will drift toward unintended and late liquidation 
proceedings, perhaps with no assets left.  
In an imminent insolvency state, the management has no reason to 
postpone the choice between restructuring and liquidation. On the 
contrary, management is required to make a conclusive choice quickly: 
rescue or liquidate. Usually, no compromises are available and—without 
good luck, like a sudden market recovery—the situation will likely lead to 
the unintended and uncontrolled end of the business; restructuring by 
change is not realistic and leads to liquidation. A partly viable company or 
group of companies (note that the mother company and the subsidiaries 
form separate insolvency estates) may be split; for the viable parts of the 
business, restructuring proceedings are opened, and the rest will be 
liquidated and wound up. However, even then, the choice must be made 
between restructuring and liquidation. 
The Choice Is Determined by the Viability Test and Best Interest of 
Creditors Test 
According to Article 4(3) of the RI Directive, member states may 
maintain or introduce a viability test under national laws, provided that 
such a test has the purpose of excluding debtor companies that do not have 
a prospect of viability and that it can be carried out without detriment to 
the debtors’ assets. Satisfying the test is a condition for access to a 
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preventive restructuring procedure (Recital 26 of the Directive). 
Furthermore, a BIT should be applied in the case of dissenting creditors or 
dissenting classes of creditors in a cross-class cram-down (the RI Directive, 
Articles 10(2)(d) and 14(1)(a)). 
Thus, two evaluations must be done according the RI Directive when a 
company is in an imminent insolvency status: to avoid liquidation, the 
business must be viable, that is, it must be able to recover and return to 
the market through restructuring (the prospect of viability). In addition, 
the outcome of recovery should not be detrimental to any dissenting 
creditor compared to liquidation. For example, for a company with assets 
that bring through liquidation to a creditor 50,000 US dollars, 
restructuring proceedings should not be opened if it is expected that the 
same (dissenting) creditor would get only 40,000 US dollars, even if there 
is, in the long run, a prospect of viability. 
Insolvency means a shortage of financial resources so that not all 
creditors can be satisfied in full when their receivables fall due. In other 
words, there is a lack of liquid assets or assets that can be transformed to 
liquid to satisfy creditors. Nevertheless, in the debtor company, there may 
be plenty of other than merchantable resources, such as highly proficient 
personnel, know-how and some highly specific and contextual intellectual 
property rights (IPR), a stable supply chain, clean technology, loyal 
customers, and a good reputation. Some of these non-monetary resources 
(“assets”) promote financial ESP, some are linked to non-financial ESEG 
sustainability, and some to both. These kinds of “soft variables” exist in 
every company and give the company added value, though they draw 
relatively little attention, perhaps because of their illusive nature [14]. For this paper, an essential matter is what role non-financial (“soft”) resources 
play in a viability test and a BIT. 
Currently, the two mentioned tests are based solely on financial 
parameters: a viability test is a prognosis of whether a business can restore 
profitability according to traditional one bottom line accounting and, if so, 
whether, according to the BIT, the value of the assets in liquidation would 
bring a better monetary outcome (share) to creditors. An indispensable 
question is whether, at the same time, it is possible to consider the 
preservation of non-financial resources, such as jobs, know-how, IPR, 
skills, and developed clean technology, in these two tests. 
ESEG Elements in Viability Test 
In a viability test, ESP is a natural part of the evaluation. Actually, the 
matter is whether the debtor company is able to return to economic 
sustainability performance. As noted, in a viability test, prognoses of 
profitability means traditional profitability or—at least—the ability to 
generate profit (revenue minus expenses). Naturally, profitability is a 
fundamental standpoint for staying on the market, and a positive cash 
flow keeps the company’s business in operation. 
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If restructuring produces only a short-term recovery not even reaching 
a level of profitability and leaves creditors worse off than in liquidation, it 
is not the right option. The criteria of viability and restructuring, 
dismissing recovery that will be only impermanent, largely identify with 
the criteria of ESP, that is, long-term profitability and financial 
sustainability. However, it can be argued that “normal” profitability and 
financial sustainability are enough to open restructuring: there need not 
be prospects for long-term financial sustainability, but on the other hand, 
short-term financial sustainability is not enough. The essential objective of 
restructuring is to raise the debtor company to a “healthy” level of 
profitability. After recovering, the ex-debtor company can, again, pursue 
ESP as auspiciously as possible. With this reservation, this paper uses 
viability and ESP as parallel notions. 
The above-mentioned notion is indirectly seen in the RI Directive. The 
Recital (at 1, 2, and 32) states that restructuring should enable debtors in 
financial distress to continue operating and stay in business and (at 68) 
that the aim is the survival of the debtor’s business. Thus, “rescue” means, 
at the first step, to help the company gain enough strength through a 
reorganization and a payment schedule to continue on the market. In fact, 
a too-ambitious objective for restructuring would favor liquidation; the 
opening of restructuring could be rejected with the argument that 
rescuing the business would allow it to reach only “normal” profitability. 
After recovery, the path to maximal profitability is clear. 
For restructuring, there must be available, inter alia, a competent 
management, enough financing, and lucrative products/services that the 
market wants. The products of the debtor company may be technically 
outdated or carry a bad reputation, such that the market is not interested 
in them. Accordingly, there is then no prospect for ESP, and, consequently, 
non-financial ESEG sustainability elements play either role. ESEG 
sustainability is dependent on profitable ESP: an unprofitable company is 
unable to care for ESEG sustainability either. And, depending on the 
market and the competitive edge, vice versa. 
ESEG sustainability is a part of proper viability testing when some or 
all ESEG elements are legally or otherwise mandatory or factually 
necessary for the operation of the debtor company. For example, there 
may be costs for the obligatory protection of the environment during the 
production process. Naturally, in a viability test, all mandatory 
operational costs will be considered. Instead, non-obligatory ESEG 
elements have a double character: with a short cut, ESEG elements may 
produce mere costs, but in the longer run, they may promote ESP. For 
example, a company may invest in more environmentally friendly 
products or production processes for five years before any profit can be 
expected. A situation where ESEG elements will be part of ESP only in the 
long run is problematic for creditors, whereas owners are willing to wait, 
because the alternative is liquidation and winding up the company, 
zeroing the value of shares. 
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According to Article 4(3) of the RI Directive, member states may 
maintain or introduce a viability test under national law, provided that 
such a test has the purpose of excluding debtors that do not have the 
prospect of viability and that it can be carried out without detriment to the 
debtors’ assets. The Article does not specify the time limit for this prospect. 
Recital 3 notes that in restructuring frameworks, the rights of all parties 
involved, including workers, should be protected in a balanced manner. On 
the other hand, where “a debtor in financial difficulties is not 
economically viable or cannot be readily restored to economic viability, 
restructuring efforts could result in the acceleration and accumulation of 
losses to the detriment of creditors, workers and other stakeholders, as 
well as the economy as a whole.” This Recital statement indicates quite 
clearly that creditors are not expected to wait long for the effects of the 
operational changes to be carried out according to the 
restructuring/reorganization plan. Indeed, for the sake of legal and 
economic security, long-term forbearance should be provided by law if 
required from creditors. Creditors should be able to trust that only such 
ESEG elements that improve the profitability of the debtor company in a 
relatively short run are included in the viability test. The timeframe is the 
proper duration of the repayment schedule; such ESEG elements that will 
not improve profitability enough during a reasonably long repayment 
schedule are detrimental to creditors. 
Thinking of the future, however, would it be reasonable to include in a 
viability test ESEG elements with a negative impact on profitability, 
though not destroying prospects toward healthy ESP in a reasonable time 
(“TBL-viability test”)? In other words, should, for example, such voluntary 
environmental costs be considered in a viability test that diminish 
profitability to some degree? Should the objective of restructuring be 
maximum ESP or balanced ESP/ESEG profitability? Further, could 
balanced ESP/ESEG profitability mean that creditors are not satisfied 
maximally but must accept partial discharge of their receivables? 
I think the answer should be yes. The legitimate objective of 
restructuring should be a balanced framework for all stakeholders. The 
TBL parameters used in accounting and reporting could be used as tools 
to measure diverse interests. An insolvency practitioner should ask for 
help from, for example, environmental authorities. In conflict situations, 
the court or other competent authority decides relations between different 
shareholders.  
Creditors can be protected through a BIT so that their share is not 
considerably smaller than in liquidation. For legal security reasons, the 
legislator can provide a percent limit for this to protect creditors. 
Discarding the maximal profitability objective of restructuring, however, 
requires potential creditors, such as financers, investors, and 
subcontractors, to know this beforehand, thus giving them the ability to 
protect their interests through, for example, pricing and securities. In this 
way, the balanced model does not lead to final losses for prudent creditors, 
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and the costs and risks will be decentralized into the market. In the end, 
the consumers will pay. In addition, there should be available secondary 
compensation schemes, such as funds, guarantees, or insurances, financed 
by the particular industry and/or society. The safest option would be that 
the conditions for a TBL viability test are provided in the law. The 
fundamental justification for this balanced model is ethical, as is the whole 
concept of ESEG sustainability. However, at the possible point where 
consumers collectively adopt said ethical base, it transforms into a normal 
market factor to be compared to consumers’ requirement that the 
products and services be healthy and of a high quality. At this point, the 
ESEG elements become real competitive edge factors encouraging 
companies to exceed the minimum ESEG requirements.  
Restructuring means a crossroads for a company to take a new 
direction in business. The interests of creditors, if protected in the above-
mentioned way, should not prevent the debtor company from taking—in 
addition to following legal and market-based environmental policy 
instruments—voluntarily ESEG actions, such as reducing harmful 
environmental externalities or saving jobs even when it diminishes 
profitability to some degree. The creditors’ interest in receiving a 
maximum share in a minimum time could be balanced with ESEG 
elements in a viability test as well. This means that it should be accepted 
that the repayment schedule (a part of restructuring/reorganization plan) 
can be quite long, back end-weighted, and perhaps mean the partial 
discharge of receivables. 
Nevertheless, at the same time, the domino effect should be avoided. A 
creditor company that must wait long for the repayment of a significant 
receivable easily drifts into financial troubles. It can be argued that an 
important ESEG element is to minimize the reflective effects of the 
restructuring of a debtor company—a functioning market is a prerequisite 
for ESP and, at the same time, a part of social/governance sustainability in 
western countries. An important restriction for a “TBL viability test” is that 
it should not affect the choice between rescue and liquidation; too meager 
a share for the creditors in ESEG-oriented restructuring may lead to 
liquidation according to the BIT.  
ESEG Elements in Best Interest of Creditors Test 
In a BIT, the evaluator (judge or other competent authority) compares 
the share for the dissenting creditor in liquidation and in restructuring. As 
noted, a dissenting creditor should get in restructuring at least as much as 
he or she would in liquidation. The test requires a simple comparison: 
which gives the greater dividend to a dissenting creditor: restructuring or 
liquidation? The purpose of the BIT is to turn down restructuring that is 
detrimental to a dissenting creditor. Detrimental restructuring means a 
benefit to the owners at the sacrifice of the creditors. It is not the 
responsibility of creditors to finance restructuring and benefit the 
shareholders when liquidation gives a better dividend.  
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As already noted, the relation between the viability test and the BIT is 
unclear. The starting point is that these two tests should not be discordant. 
Therefore, a logical requirement is that the share for a creditor is 
calculated according to the repayment schedule in restructuring. As 
argued in the previous part, non-financial ESEG sustainability elements 
should be implemented in a balanced way, seeking return to the market 
and recovery to profitability. Regarding the BIT, it is essential that the 
payment schedule when considering ESEG sustainability elements is not 
too strict, thus favoring instant liquidation. Therefore, three factors must 
be balanced: (a) ESEG sustainability components, (b) repayment for 
creditors in restructuring, and (c) share in liquidation. Even when 
implementing voluntary ESEG elements, the creditors’ interest must be on 
a sufficient level so that unnecessary instant liquidation can be avoided. 
Voluntary ESEG elements in the test should be balanced so that liquidation 
is not the best choice if the company is still viable. 
One important factor in the comparison between restructuring and 
liquidation is whether liquidation would take place by piecemeal vending 
or by selling the assets as a going concern. Here, again, decisive in 
liquidation is which selling form produces the best financial outcome for 
the creditors. In a going-concern framework, manufactured capital, such 
as plants, machines, and technology, as well as human capital, such as 
intangible resources (patents, trademarks, business secrets, data 
protection systems, know-how, and reputation) accumulated and stored in 
the business of the debtor, can be retained [15]. 
From a sustainability viewpoint, there is an important difference 
between selling a debtor’s property and selling a debtor’s business. In the 
latter case, the added value gathered in the business (compared to “pure” 
property) can be maintained. Sustainable selling benefits creditors, 
whereas the position of employees usually depends on whether the buyer 
is willing to hire them (see the above-mentioned Smallsteps case). From a 
strong sustainability perspective (that is, a non-substitutability paradigm 
concerning natural resources), however, selling the assets as a going 
concern does not necessarily mean a pleasant outcome. For example, 
selling a mine that pollutes the surroundings and spoils water systems is 
not a triumph for nature, even if the mining activity is legal and fulfils the 
requirements set out in the environmental permit. Thus, preserving a 
functional business entity is in accordance with sustainability for saving 
the company history with investments in functionality but, in the end, the 
most crucial matter is whether the saved entity operates in accordance 
with sustainability. However, it is not the task of the insolvency system to 
prevent legally operating ESP from recovering and continuing. 
According to Recital 2 of the RI Directive, preventive restructuring 
frameworks should enable debtors to restructure effectively at an early 
stage and to avoid insolvency, thus limiting the unnecessary liquidation of 
viable enterprises. These frameworks should help to prevent job losses 
and the loss of know-how and skills and maximize the total value to 
 
Journal of Sustainability Research 12 of 28 
J Sustain Res. 2020;2(2):e200019. https://doi.org/10.20900/jsr20200019 
creditors, in comparison with what they would receive in the event of 
liquidation of the enterprise’s assets, as well as to owners and the economy 
as a whole.  
By this, the RI Directive indicates non-financial ESEG sustainability. 
Article 19 features the same “signals” according to which directors must 
have due regard for the interests of creditors, equity holders, and “other 
stakeholders”. Some kind of tendency toward the border stakeholder 
concept, even if not a deviation from the BIT and creditor protection, is to 
be seen. It is not justified to say that the Directive underlines the maximum 
individual or collective return to creditors (common pool theory) 
either [16,17]. 
There is some kind of a dilemma in the BIT: if the non-monetary assets 
that do not directly promote profitability, such as expensive clean 
technology that presents a valuable ESEG element, are considered purely 
as costs in restructuring, it impairs the possibilities for restructuring by 
offering perhaps a lower share to creditors compared to in liquidation. 
Another way of looking at the matter is to calculate an integral TBL “share” 
in the BIT, thus expanding the stakeholder set. If the ESEG elements are 
totally set aside to be abandoned in future operation, the outcome is that 
insolvency leads automatically to a shift in the business culture of the 
distressed company—one could say, in the opposite direction than 
signaled by the EU (see later the EU Green Deal). 
THE CONSEQUENSES OF THE CHOICE BETWEEN RESCUE AND 
LIQUIDATION 
Should Creditors’ Interests Yield for the Sake of ESEG? 
Surely, the choice between opening restructuring and liquidation 
proceedings has highly different consequences in all sections of financial 
ESP and non-financial ESEG sustainability.  
In liquidation, ESEG sustainability elements, such as jobs, skills, 
goodwill, cultural values, investments in ecology/clean industry, and some 
highly contextual IPRs, may be lost entirely if the estate is sold in a 
piecemeal way. This demonstrates the difference between selling the 
property versus selling the business of a debtor company. When the assets 
intended for sale form a functional entity, which is kept in operation or as 
a whole in a stand-by status for sale, the debtor’s business will be sold, not 
only the property. From a sustainability perspective, the business-based 
ESEG elements and their added value in the property are then preserved. 
The ESEG elements gathered in the company remain in the original 
context and in a mutual interaction in such a combination that it is 
lucrative for purchasers and that promotes profitability. If not, piecemeal 
vending may be a better alternative. Naturally, then, ESP is not relevant 
due to the splitting of the property and, subsequently, the business.  
When the bankruptcy estate aims to sell the assets as a going concern 
to get a better selling price in liquidation, the bankruptcy practitioner can 
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temporarily operate the business as usual or at least keep it whole until a 
purchaser is found. In the best case, all relevant ESEG sustainability 
resources may be saved. However, from the ESEG perspective, this is only 
luck; usually, the decisive matter in liquidation proceedings is not saving 
ESEG resources but the selling price. If the financial outcome is better for 
the creditors, the liquidation system is blind to losing other kinds of 
resources. Therefore, we may ask whether creditor protection is too 
excessive. 
Here, an important matter is predictability: if the creditors know the 
risks beforehand, it is reasonable to save valuable ESEG resources in 
liquidation. However, some creditor groups are in advance unable to 
protect their interests. On the other hand, these creditors, such as tax 
administration, are able to open the bankruptcy proceedings on time to 
prevent additional damage. Moreover, secondary compensation systems 
can be available for creditors suffering from the saving of ESEG elements 
in the public interest. 
On certain conditions, laid down in the law, the bankruptcy 
practitioner should be allowed to make the choice between piecemeal 
selling and selling as a going concern on the basis that valuable ESEG 
resources can be saved even if creditors do not get the maximum dividend. 
It is not excluded that piecemeal selling protects ESEG elements efficiently. 
Splitting assets and introducing them to new hands may, in some cases, be 
the best way to save ESEG resources and perhaps, at the same time, bring 
the best selling price. For example, selling IPR and high technology 
equipment without “walls” may be the best alternative. However, if it does 
not bring a better selling price, it is not a consolation for creditors with 
unpaid claims to know that the resources are being recycled somewhere 
in the market in a sustainable way. 
In restructuring, the possibilities for saving resources may be better 
than in liquidation. However, in restructuring, there is always the risk for 
failure. The market is not more sympathetic toward a company in 
restructuring proceedings than any other company. Moreover, as 
restructuring is more or less debtor in possession (DIP) proceedings, there 
may prevail higher risks than usual, depending on the skills of the 
management and owners and whether a successful reorganization has 
been implemented; a debtor company faces normal business risks and the 
requirement of competent management combined with the ability to 
implement a rescue strategy. Without normal business risks, the market 
would be unable to eliminate non-viable businesses that, in turn, would 
distort competition on the market. 
Let us assume that the debtor company in restructuring has avoided 
failure and rescue has succeeded. After reorganization, more or less, ESEG 
sustainability factors have remained (jobs, IPR, know-how, environmental 
inputs, etc.)—how much depends on the ESP/ESEG relation: to strive for 
maximal profitability during the repayment schedule, the debtor company 
may have to abandon ESEG elements that diminish one bottom line 
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profitability. For example, a debtor company that has been investigated 
for voluntary ESEG sustainability, thus having a too-expensive ecological 
production system compared to the competitors on the same market, is 
obliged to abandon these inputs to regain its competitiveness. Otherwise, 
restructuring fails because the debtor company is unable to operate on the 
market, so it produces enough profit after covering ESEG expenses. In this 
case, there are two alternatives: either obviating extra ESEG costs or 
resulting in liquidation. The BIT protects creditors by ensuring that 
profitability during the repayment schedule reaches the same level as the 
creditors’ share in liquidation. 
A Wide Stakeholder Cluster 
An important business culture matter is that companies should be 
encouraged not to lose sight of long-term sustainable strategies, even in 
financial distress [18]. The literature asks why directors continue to 
respect their sustainability and responsibility (CSR) obligations even in 
insolvency proceedings. One argument against the responsibility is that 
these functions pose an unnecessary and costly burden on companies in 
distress. Others may argue that sustainability is a valid function in 
insolvency, and management should have the same responsibility in this 
regard as before opening the insolvency proceedings: why should 
sustainability aspects become any less important just because of 
insolvency proceedings? It can be argued that directors may have 
obligations to a wider group of stakeholders, not only to creditors [19].  
A wider stakeholder cluster, including ESEG values, may or may not 
diminish the weight of creditor interest. It depends on the relation 
between this cluster and ESP/profitability. This paper suggests, for the 
optimal governing of the consequences of insolvency proceedings on ESEG 
elements, that: 
- Creditor interest should yield to some degree so a viable company can 
be rescued; 
- Creditors should, however, get reasonable repayment during a 
reasonably long repayment schedule in restructuring; 
- ESEG values should be saved to the degree that would make all this 
possible.  
This requires BIT be modified accordingly so a slightly better share in 
liquidation does not lead to the liquidation of an otherwise viable 
company and that creditors be aware in advance of the protection of ESEG 
values (provisions in law). In addition, some secondary compensation 
systems can be available for creditors according to political decision-
making. 
The first to react in imminent insolvency is the management of the 
company. The tradition that underlines creditors’ interests seems to be in 
transition regarding management. There are some indications of this in 
the RI Directive, where Recital 71 highlights that the responsibility of 
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management to make the right decisions in time in imminent insolvency 
has been stressed in the RI Directive. Directive Article 19 (Duties of 
directors where there is a likelihood of insolvency) obliges member states 
to ensure that where there is the likelihood of insolvency, directors have 
due regard, as a minimum, to the following: (a) the interests of creditors, 
equity holders, and other stakeholders; (b) the need to take steps to avoid 
insolvency; and (c) the need to avoid deliberate or grossly negligent 
conduct that threatens the viability of the business. The duties are not easy 
to implement, and a “safe harbor” defense been argued to allow the 
directors of a company in financial distress to explore restructuring 
options without the risk of liability for insolvent (wrongful) trading [20]. 
It has been argued that the duty owed by directors to creditors is a form 
of creditor protection to prevent systemic troubles in the financial system 
due to a certain kind of chain reaction. In other words, the company owes 
a duty to its creditors to keep its property unviolated and available for 
repayment of its debts. Special attention should be paid to unsecured 
creditors who are only protected by contractual rights and always get a 
small (if not non-existent) amount when the company goes into liquidation 
[19]. The interest relations among management, creditors, and 
shareholders are complicated. It has been noted that, in practice, the 
management and shareholders are, on the one hand, working on a rescue 
attempt and, on the other, looking for ways to reduce their exposure in 
case the attempt is unsuccessful. In restructuring, the management may 
stay in place, and there is a possibility that shareholders retain their equity 
partly or totally. In successful restructuring, shareholders and 
management may benefit the most [21]. Real creditor protection requires 
objectivism beyond these matters.  
The new way of thinking is that management must have due regard for 
the interests of not only creditors, but also equity holders and “other 
stakeholders”. This may be called “stakeholderism”. The problem is that in 
the RI Directive, there is not a word about who these other stakeholders 
are. A “stakeholder” can be defined as any person whose rights or interests 
are affected directly or indirectly by insolvency or restructuring 
proceedings, which is why they may have to be involved under insolvency 
and restructuring laws [20,22–24]. Is, for example, the “green stakeholder” 
(nature) one? 
Within the collective body of the creditors, interests are mutually 
competitive (“insolvency crowd” in decision making [25]) and considered 
according to the provided priority and otherwise according to the equal 
ranking following the pari passu principle. This inside competition does 
not prevent the mutual and collective interest of getting the best possible 
selling price. Only secured creditors are unrelated to the selling price, but 
this is merely when the value of the collateral completely covers the 
secured claim. In corporation bankruptcy, virtually the most evident 
group of stakeholders at risk is unsecured creditors. 
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Before focusing sustainability on “all stakeholders”, more analysis is 
required concerning the matter of who the stakeholders are in different 
insolvency proceedings compared to the normal operations of a company. 
Categorization into internal and external stakeholders can be conducted 
[26]. In normal business operations, the internal stakeholders of a 
company are the management, the owners (shareholders and other equity 
holders), and the employees, whereas external stakeholders are the 
creditors/financers, suppliers, customers, and society (public interest). 
When liquidation proceedings are opened, the management is removed 
from their position due to the non-DIP character of the proceedings. The 
owners stay as internal stakeholders in liquidation—and lose the value of 
the shares, as the company will be dissolved. The shareholders’ ownership 
is supplanted by the creditors (whose rights are turned into equity-like 
rights), and the creditors are the major stakeholders in the proceedings 
[19]. In piecemeal liquidation, the employees change their position from 
internal to external stakeholders, whereas when selling as a going 
concern, the employees can remain internal stakeholders, now with a new 
owner. In liquidation, nature is an external stakeholder, not in the role of 
a green creditor but rather representing public interest with the demand 
to take care of environmental responsibilities. 
In restructuring proceedings, the management remains an internal 
stakeholder controlled perhaps to some degree—depending on the type of 
DIP—by the insolvency practitioner appointed by the court. As with the 
management, the shareholders lose some of their power depending on the 
modification of the DIP scheme. Before insolvency, it is in the interest of 
the shareholders (internal stakeholders) to satisfy the claims of the 
creditors (external stakeholders) to prevent the creditors from initiating 
insolvency proceedings. In an insolvency situation, instead, this mutual 
interest shifts into a competition scheme: shareholders pursue to retain 
within the company as many assets as possible, whereas creditors seek a 
maximum share from the same assets. However, the competitive interests 
of the shareholders do not extend beyond the point where the creditors 
get more in liquidation. That is, even in an insolvency situation, the 
shareholders’ interest is to satisfy the claims of the creditors to the point 
where the creditors are better off than in a liquidation. The interest of the 
shareholders is to retain restructuring as an option. Liquidation is the 
worst option for shareholders but not always for creditors. Regarding 
workers, in restructuring, they remain internal stakeholders and can 
maintain their position if the restructuring works out. In this pattern, the 
environmental ESEG elements belong to an external stakeholder position 
representing the public interest.  
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ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY IN RESTRUCTURING AND 
LIQUIDATION 
Operator Is Responsible, but What if There Is No Operator? 
Regarding ecological matters, in restructuring, handling possible 
environmental hazards is a part of the business. If the environmental 
problem is known, the responsibility for taking care of it is a cost of 
operations. As in restructuring, where the operations of the debtor 
company continue “business as usual”, the same environmental 
requirements prevail as before opening the restructuring proceedings. In 
the EU, there is in force a “polluter pays” principle [27], which applies even 
when the debtor company continues its operation in restructuring 
proceedings. If an environmental hazard occurs later during 
reorganization, it presents a normal responsibility to act, leading to 
expenses the company must cover, possibly even resulting in a failure of 
restructuring. 
When the opened insolvency proceeding is liquidation, the debtor 
company does not continue “business as usual”. Instead, the purpose of 
liquidation is to cease the business of the debtor company. However, this 
does not prevent someone else from continuing the same business. The 
bankruptcy estate may continue the debtor company’s operations to sell it 
as a going concern. Then, there are well-founded reasons to require that 
the estate bear all the normal environmental responsibilities provided in 
the law for an operator. In this case, the bankruptcy estate is in a similar 
situation to other operators, and it must take care of the “new” 
environmental problems (originating from the estate’s operation), as well 
as “old” problems (originating from the debtor company’s previous 
operation). For example, if the bankruptcy estate continues mining and 
selling ore, the administrator has to consider, on the one hand, the 
responsibilities of an operator according to the law and required by the 
permit for operation and, on the other, the expected additional selling 
price as a going concern. 
A complicated question arises when the bankruptcy estate does not 
continue the operations of the debtor company but keeps the business in 
stand-by mode, aiming to sell it as a non-going concern (or to sell the 
property in a piecemeal way). The bankruptcy estate, for example, does 
not extract or sell ore, but it maintains the mine as a whole unit with 
facilities and vehicles ready for operation. It is not obvious whether the 
estate then is responsible for caring for the “old” environmental problems 
or the “new” problems that occur despite passivity, that is, the problem 
that occurs or worsens is self-aggravated due to the past actions of the 
debtor company. 
One possibility to answer this question is to connect the responsibility 
of the bankruptcy estate to the acuteness of the present environmental 
hazard. If the situation is serious and public interest is prominent, the 
bankruptcy estate must act as anybody else would in the same situation 
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and use the assets to prevent additional damage and repair the harm that 
occurred. The estate has no right to expect society (taxpayers) to act 
instead of the estate.  
Of course, a bankruptcy estate without any assets is unable to act, and 
no liability can be laid on a bankruptcy administrator or the creditors, 
even if the environmental situation is serious. Then, in the name of public 
interest, society must act. The other matter is whether someone is 
responsible for repayment to society due to negligence or crime 
(management/owners). 
Again, this is the legal side of the matter. From a sustainability 
perspective, it is not important who bears responsibility for the costs of 
preventing or repairing an environmental hazard or damage. Society may 
be willing to take responsibility, and so safeguard start up and funding for 
an important industry, such as mining and energy production. Ultimately, 
the matter is political. The legislator has to balance the public interest in 
sustainability and the possibilities for industry to get financing at a 
reasonable rate. “Nature does not know” who caused and who repaired 
the damage; an ethical demand is that “somebody” bears the 
responsibility. Moreover, there are many possibilities of decentralizing 
the responsibility using different kinds of secondary funds, guarantees, 
and insurance systems. 
The situation is akin to when a non-acute environmental problem 
causes cleaning costs (for example, tons of scrap metal in the area) so 
extensive that the property is deemed worthless or to have a negative 
value, meaning no one is willing to take the property, even free. If there 
are no assets in the bankruptcy estate, nothing can be done and the site 
must be cared for by society. In this case, there should be provisions that 
make it possible for society to expropriate the land to avoid orphan lands. 
If there are assets with value in the insolvency estate, the tricky 
question is whether the estate is allowed to cut off the contaminated part 
of the property and keep the rest or whether the estate is obliged to use 
the assets for reparation or cleaning the spoiled part of the property. 
Externalizing the spoiled part of the property means factually abandoning 
that property. For example, leaving the polluted land in the possession of 
the original company means factual abandonment, as the original 
company will be wound up (dissolved) at the end of the proceedings and 
removed from the company register. Usually, the ex-company is then 
without management and legal capacity. The abandoning of the polluted 
part of the assets is acceptable only if outlined in the law, whereas as a 
one-sided action from a bankruptcy estate, that is, without “permission”, 
abandonment is hardly acceptable. 
The option of leaving the liability for the spoiled property to 
shareholders is excluded unless there is some ground for liability other 
than owning shares of the company. This is a fundamental principle 
concerning limited liability companies. Otherwise, for example, owning 
mine shares would be highly risky regarding personal liability. 
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A Global Problem: Bankruptcy Estate Liability for Environmental 
Problems 
Around the world, there has been a dilemma regarding environmental 
liabilities in bankruptcy proceedings. Thus far, the EU legislation has been 
surprisingly silent. Accordingly, different EU member states have resolved 
the dilemma in different manners or left it untouched. In the RI Directive, 
there is not a word on nature, environmental, or ecological matters. 
Nothing can be found in the Insolvency Regulation, Recast (EU) 2015/848 
either [28]. This Regulation applies to cross-border situations in the 
insolvency proceedings that member states have listed in Annex A of the 
Regulation.  
However, in the EU Community acquis (regime), some important 
guidelines can be found: Article 11 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU [29]) sets environmental protection as a general 
objective of EU law in all areas. Article 11 of the TFEU (under Title II: 
Provision having general application) reads as follows: “Environmental 
protection requirements must be integrated into the definition and 
implementation of the Union’s policies and activities, in particular with a 
view to promoting sustainable development”. In other words, Article 11 
requires the national institutions and authorities to promote 
environmental protection when implementing EU policies and 
interpreting EU law. 
Article 11 of the TFEU is linked to Article 191 (Environment) TFEU and 
to Article 3(3) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU [29]). Article 3(3) of 
the TEU refers to economic, social, and environmental sustainability: the 
Union shall establish an internal market. It shall work for the sustainable 
development of Europe based on balanced economic growth and price 
stability; a highly competitive social market economy, aiming at full 
employment and social progress; and a high level of protection and 
improvement of the quality of the environment. It shall promote scientific 
and technological advance. 
The above-mentioned articles concerning environmental sustainability 
are legally binding rules in the EU. However, their precise legal effects are 
still uncertain, and there have been many challenges in enforcing them 
[30]. The mentioned rules are quite abstract and they are not easily 
applicable to concrete situations. Nevertheless, they should have a strong 
interpretation impact on national laws. Optimistically, this impact will 
gather even more strength and concretion when the EU document “The 
European Green Deal” 2019 (Communication that sets out a European 
Green Deal for the European Union and its citizens [31]) is realized. The 
Green Deal “resets the Commission’s commitment to tackling climate and 
environmental-related challenges that is this generation’s defining task.” 
All EU actions and policies are supposed to contribute to European Green 
Deal objectives. The Green Deal is a part of the implementation of the 
United Nation’s (UN) 2030 Agenda [32] and sustainable development goals. 
The UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development affirms (at point 
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“Planet”) that we are determined to protect the planet from degradation, 
including through sustainable consumption and production, sustainable 
management of its natural resources and urgent action on climate change 
so that it can support the needs of present and future generations. Further, 
at point “Prosperity”, the Agenda announces that we are determined to 
ensure all human beings can enjoy prosperous and fulfilling lives and that 
economic, social, and technological progress occurs in harmony with 
nature. 
The EU Green Deal includes a green oath: “do no harm”. All EU actions 
and policies should pull together to help the EU achieve a successful and 
just transition to a sustainable future. In addition, the Commission will 
offer better regulation guidelines and improved support tools addressing 
sustainability and innovation issues. The aim is for all Green Deal 
initiatives to achieve their objectives in the most effective and least 
burdensome way. An explanatory memorandum including legislative 
proposals and delegated acts is in preparation. 
Unfortunately, the Green Deal includes not a word on how to proceed 
and promote the program when corporations face economic distress. In 
some stages of the business life cycle, a significant number of companies 
fall into financial troubles, such as start-up companies. It is unclear why 
this natural status of companies is not considered in the Communication.  
Hopefully, however, the Communication gives some guidelines, for 
example, for national “battles” related to the problem of bankruptcy 
estates struggling with environmental hazards. A bankruptcy practitioner 
perhaps has no clear rules to follow, and the creditors demand the assets 
that are left in the debtor company. At the same time, an environmental 
hazard should be repaired or at least its consequences limited to protect 
the environment, such as groundwater, soil, and air. This conflict of 
interest has proven difficult for many countries around the world. 
Canada Shows the Way 
Canada presents a precedent to follow, that is, the decision of the 
Supreme Court of Canada in the Orphan Well Association v. Grant 
Thornton Ltd. case (31 January 2019, 2019 SCC 5, number 37627). The core 
ruling is that the bankruptcy estate must fulfill environmental obligations 
before paying creditors. In the case, an additional question arose as to 
whether the federal Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA) and provincial 
Acts were conflicting and questions concerning the application of the 
doctrine of federal paramountcy. However, the majority of the judges (5–
2) found no conflict. Here, the relation between Canadian Acts is set aside, 
and the focus is on the part of the judgment that concerns the 
environmental responsibilities of the bankruptcy estate. 
Redwater was an oil and gas company that owned over a hundred 
wells, pipelines, and facilities (hereinafter “oil wells”) and Grant Thornton 
Ltd. (GTL) was appointed its receiver in 2015. The Redwater company went 
into bankruptcy in 2015. Under provincial legislation, the Alberta Energy 
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Regulator will not grant a license to extract, process, or transport oil and 
gas in Alberta unless the licensee assumes end-of-life responsibilities for 
plugging and capping oil wells to prevent leaks, dismantling surface 
structures, and restoring the surface to its previous condition 
(“abandonment” and “reclamation”). The Energy Regulator notified GTL 
that it was legally bound to fulfill abandonment obligations for all licensed 
assets prior to distributing any funds or finalizing any proposal to 
creditors. The provincial Regulator required these end-of-life 
responsibilities with respect to oil wells. Dismantling the sites and 
restoring the land would have cost millions of dollars more than they were 
worth. To avoid costs, the trustee of the bankruptcy estate was not taking 
responsibility for the company’s unproductive oil and gas assets. The 
bankruptcy trustee decided to leave aside the useless wells and sell the 
productive sites to pay the creditors.  
The Regulator and the Orphan Well Association (OWA) filed an 
application for orders requiring GTL to fulfill the end-of-life obligations. 
GTL brought its own cross-application. The chambers judge and a majority 
of the Court of Appeal judges agreed with GTL. In the Supreme Court, an 
above-mentioned majority of judges stated that bankruptcy is not a license 
to ignore rules, and insolvency professionals are bound by and must 
comply with valid provincial laws during bankruptcy. The Supreme Court 
decision noted that the non-monetary obligations that are binding on the 
bankrupt estate could not be reduced to provable claims, and this does not 
conflict with the BIA, notwithstanding the consequences for the 
bankrupt’s secured creditors. The purpose of the BIA was the equitable 
distribution of the bankrupt’s assets among the creditors, not setting aside 
environmental responsibilities. The Supreme Court ruled that the 
end-of-life obligations binding on GTL were not claims provable in the 
Redwater bankruptcy and not all environmental obligations will be claims 
in bankruptcy. 
The Supreme Court used a so-called “Abitibi” test to determine whether 
a particular regulatory obligation amounts to a claim provable in 
bankruptcy. If so: (1) there must be a debt, liability, or obligation to a 
creditor; (2) the debt, liability, or obligation must be incurred before the 
debtor becomes bankrupt; and (3) it must be possible to attach a monetary 
value to the debt, liability, or obligation. The decisive matter for the case 
was the first requirement. The Supreme Court noted that a Regulator 
exercising power to enforce a public duty is not a creditor of the individual 
or corporation subject to that duty. The Regulator acts in the public 
interest, where the public is the beneficiary of environmental obligations, 
and the province does not gain financially from them.  
The conclusion of the Supreme Court was that that GTL cannot walk 
away from the environmental liabilities of the bankrupt estate. The Court 
held that through a proper application of the Abitibi test, the Redwater 
estate must comply with ongoing environmental obligations that were not 
claims provable in bankruptcy. Accordingly, the appeal was allowed and 
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the Regulator’s request for an order that the proceeds from the sale of 
Redwater’s assets be used to address Redwater’s end-of-life obligations 
was granted. 
The conclusions of the Canadian Supreme Court are well grounded and 
present that non-monetary obligations to protect public interests do not 
transform to monetary claims (receivables) to be lodged in the bankruptcy 
proceedings. On a more general level, it can be argued that, in the same 
way, a bankruptcy estate must continue to obey other obligatory 
legislation, such as protecting employees from work accidents. The 
purpose of liquidation proceedings is “clearing” an insolvency situation by 
dealing the assets to creditors according to a priority list and ceasing the 
operations of the debtor company. This purpose does not set aside other 
responsibilities laid down in the law if not otherwise specified. 
Sometimes the responsibility to act against an environmental hazard is 
called a super priority [9]. The term is reasonable where, in the first place, 
authorities have been obliged to act to prevent further damage. Then, the 
authorities can take the costs with the highest priority from the estate. 
Otherwise, the responsibility of the bankruptcy estate to act itself would 
be too lucrative to ignore. As noted, according to the Canadian precedent, 
environmental responsibility is not a receivable but a responsibility to act. 
From this perspective, one could talk about a super responsibility of the 
estate to take care of the environmental problems. 
If this super responsibility is reduced to an ordinary claim provable in 
a liquidation, it affects also the choice between restructuring and 
liquidation when favoring liquidation: it is a huge advantage for the 
creditors if society gets compensation for the costs of the environmental 
hazard only as a share according to the pari passu rule, compared to 
restructuring where the company, as a normal operator, must take all 
actions the law requires repair the environmental problems. Inevitably, 
the BIT indicates to choose liquidation if the costs for preparing 
environmental damage will be diluted according to the pari passu rule, 
compared to restructuring, where the debtor company continues as an 
operator and is responsible to act and bear the costs. The super 
responsibility principle does not cause this kind of a bias. 
DISCUSSION: INSOLVENCY CHALLENGING THE PURPOSE OF A 
CORPORATION  
In August 2019, the American Corporate Governance Business 
Roundtable released an updated Statement on the Purpose of a 
Corporation to Promote “An Economy That Serves All Americans” [33]. The 
statement redefined the purpose of a corporation to promote an economy 
that serves all Americans. The Statement moved the focus from 
shareholder primacy to commitment to all stakeholders. The statement 
reflects the modern way corporations operate. A corporation generates 
added value to shareholders, but the best-run companies put the customer 
first and invest in their employees and communities, thus generating long-
 
Journal of Sustainability Research 23 of 28 
J Sustain Res. 2020;2(2):e200019. https://doi.org/10.20900/jsr20200019 
term value and sustainability for business and society. The statement 
includes a commitment to: 
- Deliver value to customers 
- Invest in employees: fair compensation; support through training and 
education; fostering of diversity and inclusion, dignity, and respect 
- Deal fairly and ethically with suppliers 
- Support the communities: respect for people and protection of the 
environment by embracing sustainable practices across businesses 
- Generate long-term value for shareholders 
The statement notes that each stakeholder is essential, and the 
companies commit to deliver value to all of them for the future success of 
the companies, communities, and country. 
The general tendency seems to be that during operations, ESEG factors 
are considered increasingly. Surely, behind this tendency is some kind of 
win–win thinking: ESP gains from implementing ESEG elements in the 
long run. This standpoint is true also in restructuring, whose objective is 
to make it possible for the debtor company to continue on the market. 
However, as above noted, creditor interest may require that the maximal 
preservation of ESEG elements not be implemented when it diminishes the 
repayment too much or takes too long. Optimal intersection can be found 
among the following three parameters: (a) the amount of repayment to 
creditors in restructuring, (b) the share for creditors in liquidation, and (c) 
preserving sustainability resources.  
In summary, a viable company should be restructured in a way that does 
not give considerably less to creditors than in liquidation when preserving 
ESEG values as much as possible. It is the best win–win result available. In 
the end, the shareholders (or other equity holders) are perhaps the biggest 
winners: the value of the shares will be preserved, forming thus a win 
(creditors)–win (ESEG)–win (owners) situation. This outcome is in 
accordance with the above-mentioned statements concerning the purpose 
of a corporation. 
In liquidation proceedings, such a triple win situation is not reachable: 
shareholders lose the value of their shares in any case, creditors usually 
get only a minor repayment, and ESEG cannot necessarily be addressed. 
In a penniless bankruptcy estate, indeed, there is a triple loss situation. 
Meanwhile, an estate with some assets arouses the question of what to do 
first: pay the creditors or take care of the environmental hazard. This 
paper suggests that, also in liquidation, solving environmental problems 
(including handling waste and end-of-life obligations) is a super 
responsibility. There is no connection left to the purpose of a corporation, 
as the liquidation ceases operations and the company will be wound up. 
Instead, public interest supersedes business sustainability. On the 
contrary, in restructuring, there is no reason to give up the above-
mentioned modern operation rules. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
In insolvency proceedings, we must ask whether the focus should be 
moved from creditors’ primacy to commitment to all stakeholders. When 
weighing the tests for choosing between restructuring and liquidation, one 
crucial question is whether it is possible—or ethically justified—to create 
shared value for all stakeholders, ecological values included. The question 
reflects one of the fundamental issues in sustainability science: how far 
we can expect that certain stakeholders can be withdrawn from the 
satisfaction of their interests in favor of non-financial ESEG sustainability 
values, that is, who “pays” for the sustainable development? 
Actually, there is a gap between business sustainability regarding a 
company in normal operation and a company in insolvency proceedings. 
Traditionally, creditors’ interests have been prominent, as evidenced in 
the viability test and the best interest of creditors “one bottom line” tests. 
However, through the triple bottom line test, an optimal point can be 
made: creditors get a fair share that is not considerably smaller than in 
liquidation and the sustainability elements are preserved as much as this 
allows. In liquidation, some balancing between creditor interest and non-
financial sustainability values is possible when choosing between 
piecemeal selling and selling the assets as a going concern. In liquidation, 
environmental problems must be cared for primarily, as they indicate the 
responsibility to act and are not reducible to monetary claims beneath. On 
a general level, it can be noted that creditors, as a group, have the benefit 
of the environmentally, socially, or ethically risky, or even heedless, 
operations of the debtor company, even if the last creditors are those who 
bear the consequences. The important thing is that creditors are able to 
protect their interests in advance and, according to national policy 
making, secondary compensation systems can be developed. The 
creditors, though a heterogeneous group, are linked more closely to the 
operations of the debtor company than taxpayers. In the end, the 
creditors’ risks transform into the prices of products and services and 
higher transaction costs in that industry. Compared to taxpayers’ burden, 
even this seems more justified. 
ESEG elements have an increasing role in the EU Community acquis 
generally and a certain role in the goal setting of the RI Directive. However, 
when defining the tests for the choice between liquidation and 
restructuring, ESEG elements are invisible. This is a problem because the 
fate of ESEG elements depends on which insolvency proceedings will be 
initiated. Many times, restructuring is a better option, but not always. This 
paper aimed to stimulate the discussion of the importance of 
acknowledging the consequences of the choice between liquidation and 
restructuring for ESEG elements, even when they are non-financial and do 
not promote the profitability of the company. The ESEG “stakeholders”, 
such as the environment, and social responsibility for employees, are left 
outside, especially in the BIT. Perhaps, there should be a best interest of 
ESEG stakeholders test as well. Inevitably, this would lead to a weakening 
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of creditor supremacy, but not necessarily of creditor protection. Final 
losses for creditors can be limited if they are able to beforehand protect 
their interests through pricing and securities. Legal certainty should be 
maintained through provisions in the law. 
The outcome of the paper is that, when choosing between restructuring 
(rescue) and liquidation, non-financial ESEG values should play a more 
prominent role as stakeholders, but in a balanced way. The current 
creditor supremacy applied by one-sided financial parameters in 
insolvency proceedings should yield to some degree so ESEG elements can 
be retained. However, the consequence should not be too strong a 
stakeholder position for ESEG elements to undermine financial ESP in 
restructuring thus leading to unnecessary liquidation. In an imminent 
insolvency situation when there is still ESP potential in a company, an 
optimum balance can be found to maintain both ESEG elements and to 
respect the interests of creditors. 
The current RI Directive is quite strict and “close” to the BIT and it 
allows only a narrow margin for ESEG elements. The national 
implementation of the new Directive is presently under way. In this 
situation, it is confusing to note that the Directive is not in accordance with 
ESEG aspects or, for example, with the EU Green Deal. 
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